What constitutes workplace harassment?
Every time I encounter a case of alleged workplace harassment, which is far, far more frequently than anyone outside this practice might think, I harken back to what the Honourable Justice Perell wrote in the case of High Parklane Consulting Inc. v. Royal Group Technologies Limited, 2007 CanLII 410 (ON SC):
[36] It is trite to say that that making a living is a stressful activity and that much of life can be nasty and brutish. Tort law does not provide compensation for all stress-causing and nasty conduct that individuals may suffer at the hands of another, and the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress that the conduct must be extreme, flagrant, outrageous and calculated to caused harm are the law’s ways of narrowing the ambit of the tort.
In short, there are some behaviours up with which one must put, if I may paraphrase the great Sir Winston Churchill.
But, returning to the point, the law does, at least in theory, prohibit workplace harassment. In the labour context, collective agreements often forbid such behaviour, so what then constitutes workplace harassment?
In a labour arbitration award released April 18, 2016, Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and Technology v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2016 CanLII 23226 (ON LA), Arbitrator Michael Bendel defined the answer as follows, “a finding of harassment requires a departure from reasonable conduct.”
The case stands as an important reminder that notwithstanding a written prohibition against workplace harassment, someone still needs to agree that the behaviour complained of rises to that level.